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INTRODUCTION 
Thirty-six years ago, in a seminal article on the public-private distinction, 
Professor Duncan Kennedy stated, 
When people hold a symposium about a distinction, it seems almost certain that 
they feel it is no longer a success. Either people can’t tell how to divide situa-
tions up between the two categories, or it no longer seems to make a difference 
on which side a situation falls.1 
There is no point in having a legal distinction if one cannot differentiate the 
categories from one another. Legal categories serve the purpose of treating sit-
uations “differently depending on which category of the distinction they fall 
into.”2 In other words, depending on how we conceptualize the procedure, pub-
lic or private, the consequences for a particular case will change.3 In the case of 
the arbitral process, the way we structure the procedure and the remedies avail-
able to the parties should be different depending on whether we consider the 
system as one that belongs to the private or the public realm. 
Deborah Hensler and Damira Khatam’s new article, Re-inventing Arbitra-
tion: How Expanding the Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and 
Blurring the Line Between Private and Public Adjudication, is an invitation to 
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of Law. S.J.D., Harvard Law School, 2017, LL.M. in International Law, Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy, 2011, LLB in Law and LLB in International Relations, ITAM, 2009. I 
am grateful to my colleagues Professors Nancy Welsh, Carol Pauli, and Milan Markovic at 
Texas A&M University School of Law for their reflections. Helpful comments were also 
provided by Professor Hiro N. Aragaki at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I also want to 
thank Professor Jean Sternlight at the University of Nevada William S. Boyd School of Law 
for putting me in touch with the Nevada Law Journal symposium editors. All errors are the 
author’s alone. 
1  Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1982). 
2  Id. 
3  Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty 
System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 46–47 (2013). 
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reevaluate the importance of maintaining the public-private distinction of adju-
dicating disputes through arbitration.4 Their main argument regarding the dis-
tinction is that the arbitral procedure has changed as a consequence of the sub-
stantive issues resolved in this particular ADR system. Their survey of U.S. 
domestic, international commercial, and investment arbitration procedures 
shows that the contemporary cases in the three domains deal more often with 
policy discussions than with purely business-to-business transactions.5 Hence, 
the arbitral system, which was originally conceived for commercial purposes, 
has become another way of litigating public law, but without the accountability 
mechanisms attached to public courts.6 Privately paid arbitrators are deciding 
issues behind closed doors that belong to the public realm.7 For example, in the 
international arena, the arbitral procedure is being used to challenge “democrat-
ically-adopted health, safety, and environmental protection regulations,” and 
this has triggered reforms to bring additional accountability mechanisms of 
“public adjudicative procedures” into the arbitral proceedings.8 
But why would a collapse of categories matter? To Hensler and Khatam it 
matters because the response to the blurring of the private-public lines has been 
to 
adapt arbitration procedures to resemble more closely public adjudicative proce-
dures: to strengthen due process by relying more heavily on documentary evi-
dence and live witness testimony and by requiring reasoned decisions, and to de-
privatize the process by publishing arbitration awards, and (in the case of inves-
tor-state arbitration) to open up the process to third-parties, including inviting 
amicus briefs.9 
                                                        
4  Deborah R. Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the 
Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Lines Between Private and 
Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. L.J. 381. The comments presented in this article to Deborah R. 
Hensler and Damira Khatam’s work were based on a draft provided to me on July 1, 2017. I 
am aware of the fact that the article had substantive changes made in its published version, 
but due to the nature of the publishing schedule, I did not have access to their final work. I 
apologize to the authors and the readers if my comments do not reflect their conclusions. 
5  Id. at 386. (“Controversies within each of the three domains reflect different historical cir-
cumstances and political dynamics. However, a common cause of controversy is the expan-
sion of the scope of arbitration in each domain to disputes for which the procedure arguably 
was not originally intended, particularly disputes with significant public policy dimensions. 
The most frequent response to criticism of this expansion in each domain has been to adapt 
arbitration procedures to resemble more closely public adjudicative procedures: to strengthen 
due process by relying more heavily on documentary evidence and live witness testimony 
and by requiring reasoned decisions, and to de-privatize the process by publishing arbitration 
awards, and (in the case of investor-state arbitration) to open up the process to third-parties, 
including inviting amicus briefs.”). 
6  Id.   
7  Id. at 413–14. 
8  Id. at 385–86. 
9  Id. at 386. 
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These are procedures close to what judges would do in regular trials.10 To 
Hensler and Khatam, failing to categorize arbitration as a private ADR process 
has brought, as a consequence, the diminishing of “the value of private dispute 
resolution for truly private disputes without fully satisfying the need for public 
dispute resolution for public disputes.”11 
In the case of investment arbitration, the consequence to Hensler and Kha-
tam is that States lose because businesses are challenging their policies, yet 
there are no accountability mechanisms attached to the procedure.12 Investment 
arbitration has “turned into a weapon for corporations to undermine laws 
properly adopted by democratic governments.”13 Moreover, the effort to in-
clude new procedural protections in investment arbitration has only generated 
delays and increased the costs of disposition, without entirely giving the due 
process protections and public accountability that domestic courts can offer.14 
In this paper, I agree in large part with Hensler and Khatam’s contention 
that we are facing a collapse of the public-private distinction, at least in the 
case of investment arbitration. However, my view is also that the trend to in-
clude public law-oriented elements into the arbitral procedure misses a counter-
intuitive point: that arbitrators interpret the remedies of the investment arbitra-
tion regime as belonging to a private system of adjudication. Even with all the 
transparency clauses and the so-called accountability mechanisms, arbitrators 
are construing the remedies available to them as if the system were purely pri-
vate.15 In ninety-nine percent of the cases that deal with public law disputes, 
arbitrators rely on mere monetary compensations when they find a breach of 
the investor’s rights.16 In other words, they might interpret public law, but the 
                                                        
10  It is not the intention of this article to analyze the changes in adjudicating public disputes 
but suffice it to say that the U.S. adjudicatory system went through a similar process in the 
1970s where federal judges changed the way they perceived public adjudication. From a sys-
tem where judges used to serve as “arbitrators” or “mediators” of disputes, to one where they 
order structural remedies and manage the conflict through complex performance orders. For 
the switch in the U.S. system, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Liti-
gation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1281–82 (1976); see also Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public 
Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1982). For a view of how the 
same perception changed globally, see generally Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of 
Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19–23 (David M. Trubeck & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
11  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 4, at 386–87. 
12  Id. at 412–20. 
13  Id. at 417. 
14  Id. at 421. 
15  See generally Rachel Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace 
Reputational Sanctions, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 259, 259 (2013) [hereinafter Brewster, Pricing 
Compliance]; Rachel Brewster, The Limits of Reputation on Compliance 323 (Harv. L. Sch. 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 09-37, 2009). 
16  Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez, The Hydrocarbon Industry’s Challenge to International In-
vestment Law: A Critical Approach, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 475, 510 (2016); see also INT’L 
CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS. (ICSID), THE ICSID CASELOAD—STATISTICS (ISSUE 
2015-1) 13 (2015). 
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consequences of violating public law remain closer to the consequences of 
breaching a purely private commercial contract.17 
The irony is that there is always an opportunity to price the violation of a 
contract and this deceives foreign investors who believe that the system is sup-
posed to prevent governments from taking certain actions.18 By treating the 
breaches of public law as breaches of private contracts, the arbitrators have sig-
naled to governments that they can factor in the costs of enacting legislation, 
forcing the renegotiation of a contract, or unlawfully expropriating foreign as-
sets. Ultimately, the best that an arbitrator will tend to do is to order monetary 
compensations.19 This fact leaves open an important question: Can we still hold 
that arbitration has now become a public adjudicatory procedure if the parties 
can openly breach their obligations and pay for doing so? Can we sustain that 
such a public system is affecting state sovereignty if the governments can ulti-
mately keep engaging in their unlawful conduct as long as they are willing to 
pay for it? Can we sustain this idea even if governments that decide not to pay 
face no global authority that can force them to do so?20 The following subsec-
tions will show how, contrary to what most of the contemporary literature 
states,21 conceptualizing investment arbitration as a public law procedure only 
hides the fact that key procedural elements of investment arbitration remain tru-
ly private.22 
I. WHY DO WE NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LAW 
IN THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION? 
Hensler and Khatam’s article follows the same line of classification that 
the general literature does when it comes to international arbitration. The gen-
eral trend is to distinguish between commercial and investment arbitration as if 
they belong to different categories, one more closely related to private law and 
the other one related to public law. The former is described as a “dispute reso-
lution mechanism of choice for international traders.”23 The latter is defined as 
                                                        
17  Sanchez, supra note 16, at 521. 
18  Brewster, Pricing Compliance, supra note 15, at 259. 
19  Sanchez, supra note 16, at 520. 
20  See generally Edward Baldwin et al., Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards, 23 J. INT’L 
ARB. 1, 1 (2006); Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Eco-
nomic Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 631, 662 (2005); Charity L. 
Goodman, Comment, Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID 
Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 449, 481 (2007). 
21  GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 5, 166 (2007); 
Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 123 (2006); Armin Von Bogdandy & Ingo 
Venzke, On the Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeon-
ing Public Authority, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 49, 71 (2013). 
22  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 4, at 412. (“Originally, the rules for investor-state arbitra-
tion were similar to those of ordinary international and domestic commercial arbitration.”). 
23  Id. at 401. 
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a semi-public adjudicatory process “dealing with investment disputes that arise 
between foreign investors and host States.”24 According to Hensler and Kha-
tam, “[I]nvestor-state arbitration was designed to provide an alternative for for-
eign investors to bring suit against a sovereign nation in that nation’s domestic 
courts when the sovereign entity allegedly breached a contract.”25 However, ac-
cording to them, States, in an effort to bring public accountability to the arbitra-
tion proceeding, have forced the arbitral institutions to add features that are 
closely related to the work of domestic courts.26 Instead of an alternative to lo-
cal courts, they are mimicking the work of the court system without fully im-
plementing the institutional accountability mechanism available at the national 
level. 
Hensler and Khatam’s views of the investment arbitration regime are con-
sistent with the work of scholars such as Gus Van Harten, Martin Loughlin, 
Stephan Schill, Armin von Bogdandy, and Ingo Venzke, who argue that the 
system has affected the way States decide and guide public policy.27 In their 
words, international investment tribunals “often assume the role of domestic 
administrative or even constitutional courts, which are possibly deficient or bi-
ased in the host country.”28 These tribunals have moved “into the space of polit-
                                                        
24  THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU & WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND 
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 621 (2d ed. 2013). 
25  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 4, at 385. 
26  Id. at 421. 
27  VAN HARTEN, supra note 21, at 166; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 21, at 121–22  
(“Our argument is that, owing to this unique conjunction of features, the regulatory conduct 
of states is, to an unusual extent, subject to control through compulsory international adjudi-
cation. Having highlighted these features, we then claim that investment arbitration is best 
analogized to domestic administrative law rather than to international commercial arbitra-
tion, especially since investment arbitration engages disputes arising from the exercise of 
public authority by the state as opposed to private acts of the state. . . . [T]he regime of inter-
national investment arbitration which has been rapidly developing since the 1990s provides 
not simply a singularly important and under-appreciated manifestation of an evolving system 
of global administrative law but that, owing to its unique features, it may in fact offer the 
only exemplar of global administrative law, strictly construed, yet to have emerged.”);Von 
Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 21, at 57. For broader views of global administrative law, 
see Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law—An In-
troduction, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 3 (Stephan 
W. Schill ed., 2010); Armin Von Bogdandy et al., Developing the Publicness of Public In-
ternational Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, in THE 
EXERCISE OF PUB. AUTHORITY BY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: ADVANCING 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 3, 4–32 (2010); Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law 
Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 663, 
671 (2005) (“It can be said that there is no realm of human activity wholly untouched by ul-
tra-state or global rules. Goods and functions that escape State control are regulated at the 
global level.”); Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Govern-
ance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administra-
tive Law 1–8 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Work-
ing Paper No. 09-46, 2009). 
28  Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 21, at 57–58 (“A further function comes into view 
if one considers international courts with respect to other institutions of public authority that 
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ical decision-making that has, at least traditionally, been reserved for admin-
istrations or legislatures.”29 Arbitrators began to reason and solve cases involv-
ing core public policies where the general population had an interest due to the 
relation between the cases and the host country’s economic development.30 
Take for example the cases involving Venezuela or Ecuador where the gov-
ernments depend on private actors to develop oil and gas fields, and at the same 
time the State revenue depends on around fifty percent of the rents generated 
by these industries.31 When these governments force a contract renegotiation or 
change their tax codes to capture more rents, they are not only changing the 
                                                                                                                                 
call for control and legitimation, i.e. in a separation-of-powers or checks-and-balances per-
spective. . . . In a vertical dimension, international courts control domestic authority against 
yardsticks of international law. International human rights courts provide the classic exam-
ple, but other courts have joined them. International trade law, strongly shaped by judicial 
practice, for example, contains detailed prescriptions for domestic regulators. Notably, do-
mestic provisions that are deemed to contradict international trade law can be challenged by 
a member of the WTO before they have been applied and without a burden on the claimant 
to show an individual legal interest in the case. The function of controlling domestic public 
authority also applies to awards rendered by ICSID tribunals.”). 
29  Id. at 58. 
30  Roberts, supra note 3, at 45–46; see also Hensler & Khatam, supra note 4, at 414 (arguing 
that “unease with investor-state arbitration grew when multinational corporations adopted a 
new strategy of using the procedure to challenge legislative mandates that were intended to 
improve public health and safety or protect the environment”). 
31  Sanchez, supra note 16, at 500. For cases involving Venezuela and extractive industries, 
see Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, 
Award, ¶ 9 (Aug. 22, 2016); Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶ 6 (Apr. 4, 2016); Highbury Int’l AVV v. Bolivarian Re-
public of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/14/10, Decision, ¶ 1 (Nov. 21, 2014); Venez. Hold-
ings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Award, ¶ 29 (Oct. 
9, 2014); Anglo Am. PLC v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/14/1, Pending (Oct. 2, 2014); Nova Scotia Power Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/1, Award, ¶ 1 (Apr. 30, 2014); Highbury Int’l AVV v. 
Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/1, Award, ¶ 1 (Sept. 26, 2013); 
Universal Compression Int’l Holdings, S.L.U. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/9, Order of the Tribunal Suspending the Proceeding, ¶ 1 (Sept. 16, 2013); 
ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction and the Merits, ¶¶ 1–2 (Sept. 3, 2013); OPIC Karimun 
Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/14, Award ¶ 20 (May 28, 
2013); Eni Dación B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/4, Order 
Taking Note of Discontinuance (Apr. 18, 2008); see also Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. Petró-
leos de Venez., S.A., ICC Arb. Case No. 15416/JRF/CA, Final Award, 19 (Dec. 23, 2011) 
(involving a dispute between Exxon Mobil subsidiary and a Venezuelan national oil compa-
ny). For cases involving Ecuador, see Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 1–2 
(Sept. 12, 2014); Burlington Res. Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 
Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 1, 3 (Dec. 14, 2012); Repsol YPF Ecuador, S.A. v. Republic of Ec-
uador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/10, Order Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Pro-
ceeding, ¶ 1 (Feb. 9, 2011); Murphy Expl. and Prod. Co. Int’l v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/4, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 31 (Dec. 15, 2010); Chevron Corp. v. Repub-
lic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Notice of Arbitration 1 
(Sept. 23, 2009). 
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rules of the game for foreign investors, they are making sure that government 
will not collapse in the face of economic crises.32 
The negative perception of investment arbitration as a deterrent mechanism 
for public policy that affects private interest has been present even in the Unit-
ed States.33 For example, Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York has public-
ly stated that treaties that contain investment arbitration provisions “indicate 
that savvy, deep-pocketed foreign conglomerates could challenge a broad range 
of laws we pass at every level of government, such as made-in-America laws or 
anti-tobacco laws.”34 
Why would arbitral institutions be out of place when deciding such public 
matters? In the end, States lawfully consented in the treaties to submit the dis-
putes to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.35 They had the sovereign preroga-
tive to decline signing the international agreements.36 The response of the main 
opponents of the system to this question is that investment arbitration tribunals 
lack the legitimacy to modify public policy.37 As opposed to domestic systems, 
                                                        
32  See generally Osmel Manzano & Francisco Monaldi, The Political Economy of Oil Con-
tract Renegotiation in Venezuela, in THE NATURAL RESOURCES TRAP: PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
WITHOUT PUBLIC COMMITMENT (William Hogan & Federico Sturzenegger eds., 2010); 
Sanchez, supra note 16, at 500; Francisco Monaldi, The Impact of the Decline in Oil Prices 
on the Economics, Politics and Oil Industry of Venezuela, CTR. ON GLOBAL ENERGY POL’Y 
(COLUM. U.), Sept. 2015, at 13–14; Francisco Monaldi, The Political Economy of Foreign 
Investment in the Oil Industry: The Case of Venezuela and Other Latin American Countries 
30 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the XIV International Economic His-
tory Congress in Helsinki, Finland). 
33  Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: 
NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 366 (2003) (explaining how the U.S. used to 
promote investment arbitration in the 1990s and now is seeking to restrict arbitration in in-
vestment treaties). 
34  Jonathan Weisman, Trans-Pacific Partnership Seen as Door for Foreign Suits Against 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/business/trans-
pacific-partnership-seen-as-door-for-foreign-suits-against-us.html [https://perma.cc/CCL3-
RK2D]. This narrative has been present in mainstream media. Anthony Depalma, Nafta’s 
Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-
little-secret-obscure-tribunals-settle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html [https://perma.cc/LR87-
ZBCG] (arguing that “the way a small group of international tribunals handles disputes be-
tween investors and foreign governments has led to national laws being revoked, justice sys-
tems questioned and environmental regulations challenged. And it is all in the name of pro-
tecting the rights of foreign investors under the North American Free Trade Agreement.”). 
35  Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 642 (1998); Laurence R. Helfer & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors 
Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 914 (2005). 
36  See generally Nancy A. Welsh et al., Using the Theories of Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Pro-
cedural Justice to Reconceptualize Brazil’s Rejection of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 45 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 105, 106–07 (2014) (arguing that, in the case of Brazil, its refusal to 
ratify the treaties is in fact a success story since the government has been available to attract 
foreign investment even without the treaties). 
37  VAN HARTEN, supra note 21, at 5 (“[A]rbitrators are able to award damages as a public 
law remedy without having to apply the various limitations on state liability that evolved in 
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where courts and administrators are subject to transparency requirements, effi-
ciency principles, due process, and the control of superior courts, the invest-
ment tribunals are not accountable to anyone.38 For example, Gus Van Harten 
argues that the proceeding is not designed to allow superior courts to review the 
decisions made by arbitrators.39 They are not sitting bodies, many of them have 
conflicts of interests, and there is no appeal process.40 In other words, states are 
shifting their decision-making process towards private foreign interest to satisfy 
an illegitimate authority, and in the process, they are giving away an essential 
part of their sovereignty. The opponents of the arbitral regime gained momen-
tum when the Transpacific Partnership was being negotiated and forced arbitral 
institutions to include more transparency-related principles.41 
                                                                                                                                 
domestic legal systems to balance the objectives of deterrence and compensation against the 
competing principles of democratic choice and governmental discretion.”); Daniel C. Esty, 
Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1490, 1494 (2006) (arguing that, for a view on how international administrative law 
could gain legitimacy, global policy-making could develop legitimate standards as the U.S. 
federal agencies did during their time of crisis); Hensler & Khatam, supra note 4, at 386 
(“[C]ritics view it as illegitimate for public policy disputes to be decided behind closed doors 
by private individuals who are privately paid.”); Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 21, at 
58 (Von Bogdandy and Venzke depart from Van Harten on this issue. They claim that 
“[c]ontrolling domestic authority contributes in many constellations to its legitimation. The 
review of public acts against general standards by an independent institution is one of the 
most powerful legitimating mechanisms.”). 
38  VAN HARTEN, supra note 21, at 159, 173 (“There has been widespread criticism of in-
vestment treaty arbitration for its lack of openness, and rightly so, for this issue goes to the 
heart of the problem of using arbitration to resolve regulatory disputes. Here, I refer to open-
ness both as the principle that the public should have access to information about adjudica-
tive decision-making and the notion that, in some cases, the legitimacy of adjudicative deci-
sions which affect regulatory concerns may require views other than those of the claimant 
and respondent to be represented in the process. . . . Regardless of whether they are ‘distin-
guished former judges’, ‘respected scholars and practitioners’, or ‘former government offi-
cials’, all arbitrators lack the independence of the most junior tenured judge. This is an out-
come of combining public law system of state liability with private arbitration. The 
dependence of arbitrators on government and business belies the claim that investment treaty 
arbitration removes sensitive disputes from the political realm and subjects them to the rule 
of law.”). 
39  Id. at 166. (“These states cannot look to the decisions of a single adjudicative body with a 
stable membership to draw together diverse readings of the treaties, many of which will es-
tablish varying bases for investor entitlements to compensation, into a firm jurisprudence. 
Incoherence poses a particular problem for states in this context because of the system’s 
unique combination of state liability and international arbitration.… This impact on state de-
cision-making is accentuated in the context of regulation of international business. All gov-
ernments decision-making depends to a degree on the ability of legislatures and administra-
tions to know the boundaries of sovereign power and the consequences of the unlawful use 
of that power. Introducing damages as a remedy in public law heightens the fiscal uncertain-
ty that accompanies regulation . . .”). Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1547–57 (2005). 
40  VAN HARTEN, supra note 21, at 173; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 21, at 147–49. 
41  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 4, at 412–15. 
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At this point, Hensler and Khatam’s main argument departs from the pri-
mary opponents of investment arbitration. Their main critique is precisely that, 
when it comes to investment arbitration, the system “began to morph into a 
semi-public process.”42 To Hensler and Khatam the accountability mechanisms 
that the opponents of the investment arbitration regime have been able to push 
contaminate the essence of arbitration. As an example, on the devolution of the 
system, Hensler and Khatam point to the new rules that include provisions that 
allow—if there is no objection by a party—for the general public to attend the 
oral hearings, for the awards to be publicly available, and for neutral third par-
ties to submit amicus curiae.43 To Hensler and Khatam, investment arbitration 
begins to look more like a system of public adjudication, losing the benefits of 
arbitration without fully integrating the checks and balances of a traditional ju-
dicial system. 
Hensler and Khatam’s critique misses an essential element of the adjudica-
tory proceeding: the remedies available to the arbitrators. Rather than a system 
moving from a private-oriented procedure to a more public one, I argue that re-
garding the remedies attached to the ADR system, it has moved the opposite 
way. The investment arbitral proceedings were designed to dissuade the inter-
national unlawful conduct of the host governments, and they included the pos-
sibility of ordering injunctions if necessary, yet the contemporary arbitrators 
have re-conceptualized the system as one where the consequences of breaching 
public law are to be treated as breaches of private contracts among private ac-
tors. 
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REGIME: A BLENDING OF 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ADJUDICATION 
There is a consensus in the literature that the contemporary investment ar-
bitration regime was designed by global institutions, particularly by the World 
Bank, to give international legal security to foreign capital so that it would flow 
into the developing nations that were coming out of colonialism.44 The assess-
ment of the World Bank designers assumed that global companies feared “po-
litical risks, such as outright expropriation without adequate compensation, 
governmental interference short of expropriation which substantially deprive[d] 
the investor of the control or the benefits of his investment, and non-observance 
by the host government of contractual undertakings on the basis of which the 
investment was made.”45 Foreign investors feared that weak institutions in the 
                                                        
42  Id. at 412. (In their own words: “[S]omething curious happened—at least when viewed 
from a historical perspective: from a private procedure along the lines of traditional domestic 
and international commercial arbitration, investor-state arbitration began to morph into a 
semi-public process.”). 
43  Id. at 412–13. 
44  ARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (1995). 
45  Id. at 161–62. 
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developing world would translate into future changes in regulation or out-front 
illegal expropriations.46 It did not matter that a particular government wanted to 
reach a fair deal with the foreign investor; that the State lacked strong modern 
democratic institutions, such as a reliable court system, left the threat of regula-
tory changes intact once the investments were made.47 In the view of the de-
signers, a legal instrument would help host governments by tying their hands to 
the mast.48 Putting it differently, the designers presumed that the threat of inter-
national litigation would modify the decision-making process of the host gov-
ernment regarding private foreign interests.49 The investors were awarded rights 
                                                        
46  José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L. L. 223, 225 (2011) (“Bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) are efforts by states to bind themselves to the mast to avoid the 
tempting sirens calling for breaches of investment contracts or nationalizations without com-
pensation.”). 
47  Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation 
Versus Causation, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 395, 398 
(Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (“The need for an externally supported com-
mitment device is motivated by the presence of sunk costs of investment which can lead to 
dynamic inconsistency of optimal policy for the host. Before the investor makes the invest-
ment, the host’s optimal policy is to promise good conditions such as low taxes. After the 
investment takes place and costs are sunk, the optimal policy for the host is to extract rents 
up to the value of the sunk costs, that is, to directly or indirectly expropriate the invest-
ment. . . . BITs can solve the problem because they provide extranational arbitration of in-
vestor compensation claims and thereby help the host to credibly commit not to change its 
policy toward the investment.”); Guzman, supra note 35, at 658–59 (“Dynamic inconsisten-
cy exists when a preferred course of action, once undertaken, cannot be adhered to without 
the establishment of some commitment mechanism. The problem is akin to wanting to ‘tie 
oneself to the mast’ but being unable to do so. . . . In the international setting, however, the 
dynamic inconsistency problem is a significant barrier to efficient foreign direct investment. 
The central problem is that a sovereign state is not able, absent a BIT, to credibly bind itself 
to a particular set of legal rules when it negotiates with a potential investor. Regardless of the 
assurances given by the host before the investment and regardless of the intentions of the 
host at the time, the host can later change those rules if it feels that the existing rules are less 
favorable to its interests than they could be. Domestic legal structures, critical to the credibil-
ity of contractual promises among private parties under domestic law, are no longer adequate 
to ensure compliance with the initial agreement.”). 
48  BROCHES, supra note 44, at 162–63 (“These proposals contemplate the establishment by 
intergovernmental action of institutional facilities for the settlement through conciliation and 
arbitration of investment disputes between participating states and the nationals of other par-
ticipating states. . . . Use of these facilities for conciliation and arbitration would be entirely 
voluntary. No government and no investor would ever be under an obligation to go to concil-
iation or arbitration without having consented to do so. But once having consented they 
would be bound to carry out their undertaking and, in the case of arbitration, to abide by the 
award. For this scheme to be fully effective, it should be embodied in an international con-
vention. . . . These proposals contemplate that, given the consent of the host government, the 
investor would have direct access to the conciliation and arbitration facilities, without the 
intervention of his national government, thus giving further emphasis to the growing recog-
nition of the individual as a subject of international law. . . This development of existing in-
ternational law would have the great merit of helping to remove investment disputes from 
the intergovernmental political sphere.”); Alvarez, supra note 46, at 225. 
49  Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Invest-
ment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 398 (2011) (“The cen-
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under international treaties regulated by public international law that in theory 
allow them to argue that the duty of the State is to avoid engaging in interna-
tionally illegal acts such as discriminatory, unfair, and unjust practices against 
foreigners.50 In case the host government breached these international obliga-
tions, the foreign investor could request, through an arbitral proceeding, that the 
arbitrators stop and reverse the action (i.e., respect the regulatory framework, 
maintain the concession, fulfill the contractual obligations).51 
As such, developing nations would benefit from participating in the in-
vestment arbitral system in two ways. They would increase the flow of interna-
tional capital into their jurisdiction, and they would avoid diplomatic confronta-
tions with the home States of global corporations.52 Moreover, by creating 
arbitral institutions, such as the World Bank’s International Center for the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the global organizations affiliated 
with the United Nations system would be relieved from “intervening in invest-
ment disputes between States and foreign nationals.”53 
III. THE ORIGINAL PUBLIC LAW ORIENTED REMEDIES 
If the purpose was to dissuade conduct of the host governments, then what 
were the remedies available in the arbitration regime? The vast majority of the 
Bilateral Investment Treaties do not contain a detailed section on remedies.54 I 
                                                                                                                                 
tral premise of investment treaties is that states that agree to the disciplines and rigors of in-
ternational investment law will enjoy benefits that offset the various costs. In exchange for 
giving up what might be called ‘policy space,’ or some measure of regulatory autonomy, 
host states expect, or hope, to receive increased flows of investment.”). 
50  See infra Part III. 
51  See infra Part III. 
52  BROCHES, supra note 44, at 162 (Aron Broches, who was one of the designers of the 
ICSID system, argued in 1963 that the establishment of an international rule of law for for-
eign investment would allow the companies to feel secure to do the adequate investment 
abroad and foster development); Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for In-
vestment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 427–28, 441 (2010) (“A fundamental purpose of invest-
ment treaties, as indicated by their titles, is to protect and promote investment. . . . The most 
common explanation for the BIT puzzle is that developing countries sign investment treaties 
in order ‘to promote foreign investment, thereby increasing the amount of capital and associ-
ated technology that flows to their territories.’ ”); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of 
International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 167–69 
(2005). 
53  CARBONNEAU & BUTLER, supra note 24, at 621; see also BROCHES, supra note 44, at 263. 
(“ICSID can serve the dual objectives of stability and flexibility in host country-investor re-
lations. Advance agreement to have recourse to ICSID can be an incentive for investors to 
assume long-term commitments and, in the words of a recent UNIDO Report, for a host state 
‘to rely less on its sovereignty prerogative and choose procedures for solving conflicts which 
do not involve conflict escalation.’ ”). 
54  See, e.g., Investment Treaty with Honduras, Hond.-U.S., art. X, XII, July 1, 1995, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 106-27; Investment Treaty with the Republic of Ecuador, Ecuador-U.S., 
art. VI, VII, Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-15; Treaty with Argentina Concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Arg.-U.S., art. VIII, Nov. 14, 
1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2; Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 
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argue that this omission is not out of legislative negligence, rather it was pre-
sumed that the arbitrators could order, except when specified differently, any 
remedy that would be appropriate given the type of breach.55 The possibility of 
ordering performance remedies is consistent with one of the oldest legal max-
ims: for there to be an interest protected by the law there must be an adequate 
remedy to the injured party (ubi jus ibi remedium).56 For instance, the Energy 
Charter states only that “[t]he awards of arbitration, which may include an 
award of interest, shall be final and binding upon the parties to the dispute. An 
award of arbitration concerning a measure of a sub-national government or au-
thority of the disputing Contracting Party shall provide that the Contracting 
Party may pay monetary damages in lieu of any other remedy granted.”57 
Hence, the Energy Charter does implicitly recognize that arbitrators can award 
other types of remedies.58 Pecuniary compensation is an option if arbitrators 
                                                                                                                                 
der Argentinischen Republik über die Förderung und den gegenseitigen Schultz von Kapita-
lanlagen [Treaty on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Arg.-
Ger., art. 10, Apr. 4, 1991, 1910 U.N.T.S. 171; Convenio Entre el Estímulo y Protección 
Recíproca de las Inversiones Entre La Republica de Venezuela y El Reino de Los Países Ba-
jos [Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Neth.-Venez., 
art. 12, Oct. 22, 1991, 1788 U.N.T.S. 45. It is noteworthy that the current U.S. model BIT 
from 2012 does replicate in Article 34 the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
Chapter 11 formula, but this was not the case in many of the BITs signed by the U.S. during 
the 1990s. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1135, 1136, 
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. 
DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH 
3S-4QCW] (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
55  One of the few international investment agreements signed in the 90s that contains an ex-
plicit mention on the type of remedies is NAFTA’s Chapter 11, Article 1135. North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 11, art. 1135, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993). (“1. Where a Tribunal makes a final award against a Party, the Tribunal may award, 
separately or in combination, only: (a) monetary damages and any applicable interest; (b) 
restitution of property, in which case the award shall provide that the disputing Party may 
pay monetary damages and any applicable interest in lieu of restitution.”). 
56  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (Neill H. Alford, 
Jr. et al. eds., The Legal Classic Library 1983) (1768). For a contemporary debate in the 
United States regarding the connection of ubi jus ibi remedium and due process, see general-
ly Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remdium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due 
Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004). 
57  THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY CHARTER CONSOLIDATED ENERGY CHARTER TREATY art. 
26(8) (2016), http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4945-CXC8] (emphasis added). For an analysis of the Energy Charter 
Treaty and its remedies section, see generally Anna de Luca, Non-Pecuniary Remedies Un-
der the Energy Charter Treaty, 3 OIL, GAS ENERGY LAW 1, 1–2 (2015). (explaining that the 
option of pecuniary remedies for actions taken by sub-national governments was introduced 
in the Treaty as a compromise solution with Canada, which raised concerns regarding the 
Federal Government’s constitutional authority to compel state governments to modify legis-
lation or policies in breach of the Treaty). 
58  De Luca, supra note 57, at 1. (“By only limiting the power of tribunals to award non-
pecuniary remedies in the case of unlawful measures of sub-national governments or authori-
ties of Contracting States, the provision vests, as a rule, arbitral tribunals instituted under the 
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decide not to order other type of remedies, but it is not the default rule. Arbitra-
tors should at least justify their decision to rely on damages if they decide not 
to order performance remedies. 
In the same vein, the ICSID Convention states in Article 54 that “[e]ach 
Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Conven-
tion as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award 
within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.”59 In 
other words, only the section of the award that contains pecuniary damages can 
be automatically enforceable. Unlike in international commercial arbitration 
and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, there is no need to request that national authorities recognize 
the award.60 For the rest of the remedies, the winning claimant would need to 
have the award recognized domestically.61 But, this provision does not preclude 
arbitrators from ordering other types of remedies. 
 In fact, the history of the negotiation of the ICSID Convention shows that 
the drafters “emphasized that awards could well order the performance or non-
performance of certain acts but all that could be enforced would be the obliga-
tion to pay damages if the party did not comply with that order.”62 Pecuniary 
obligations were the primary option if performance failed or for cases where 
there was an apparent lack of effective, prompt, and adequate compensation for 
expropriation.63 In the words of Aron Broches, who designated the contempo-
rary arbitral system, “It may be assumed, however, that awards will wherever 
possible impose pecuniary obligations, in the form of liquidated damages, pen-
alties or otherwise, in case of non-compliance with obligations of specific per-
formance.”64 Some ICSID tribunals recognize that they can order other types of 
                                                                                                                                 
ECT with the authority to grant both pecuniary remedies (i.e., compensation) and non-
pecuniary remedies (i.e., orders for specific performance) in all other cases.”). 
59  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States art. 54(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 (emphasis added). 
60  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 1, June 
10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
61  CHRISTOPH SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1138 (2d ed. 
2009). (In the words of Christopher Schreuer, “There is no doubt that an obligation imposed 
by an award that is expressed not in monetary terms but in terms of an obligation to perform 
a particular act or to refrain from a certain course of action is equally binding and gives rise 
to the effect of res judicata.”). 
62  Id. at 1137. (Schreuer citing comments by Mr. Broches). 
63  Id. (“The restriction of the obligation to enforce to pecuniary obligations deals with the 
difficulty that might have arisen if the award provides for forms of relief that are unknown to 
the law of the country where enforcement is sought. For instance, in some countries the 
courts may not have the power to order specific performance. Art. 54(3) provides that execu-
tion shall be governed by the law of the State where the execution is sought. Since enforce-
ment of pecuniary obligations is presumably available under every legal system, this provi-
sion eliminates the problems that could arise from different procedures for the enforcement 
of judgments.”). 
64  BROCHES, supra note 44, at 235. (“It will be noted, first, that enforcement under Article 
54 is limited to the pecuniary obligations imposed by an award. In other words, enforcement 
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remedies because “in addition to declaratory powers, [they have] the power to 
order measures involving performance or injunction of certain acts.”65 In the 
words of another tribunal, “[S]pecific performance is a permissible remedy in 
international law. An international tribunal has the power to grant specific per-
formance.”66 In sum, there is nothing in the history of the design of the con-
temporary investment arbitral system that prevents us from concluding that ar-
bitrators were given powers to “order non-pecuniary relief such as an 
injunction or an order of specific performance.”67 These powers are closely re-
lated to public adjudication that seeks to prevent the action from continuing the 
violation of rights. Injunctive relief as a corner stone of public adjudication 
contrasts with private ADR procedures where money damages are the default 
relief and represent the only enforceable remedy.68 
The inclusion of performance remedies in the powers of the investment tri-
bunals is consistent with the views of other international courts like the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and its successor the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) on the international responsibility of the State for wrong-
ful acts. In 1928 the PCIJ stated that “[t]he essential principle contained in the 
actual notion of an illegal act . . . is that reparation must, as far as possible, 
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation 
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been commit-
ted.”69 If restitution was not possible, then “payment of a sum corresponding to 
the value which a restitution in kind would bear.”70 In the 1980s the ICJ con-
firmed that the role of international courts is first to seek the cessation of the 
                                                                                                                                 
does not extend to negative or positive injunctions. It may be assumed, however, that awards 
will wherever possible impose pecuniary obligations, in the form of liquidated damages, 
penalties or otherwise, in case of non-compliance with obligations of specific perfor-
mance.”). 
65  Enron Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Juris-
diction, ¶ 13 (Jan. 14, 2004). 
66  Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. The Republic of Tajikistan, Case No. V (064/2008), 
Final Award, at ¶ 47 (Arb. Inst. Stockholm Chamber of Com. 2010), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0024_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6Y4A-34AP] (the tribunal asserted the power to grant specific performance after recognizing 
that the 2001 Draft Article on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
of the International Law Commission of the United Nations were applicable to the case). 
67  Christoph Schreuer, Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration, 20 ARB. INT’L 325, 
325 (2004). 
68  Gervase MacGregor et al., Overview: Economic Damages, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Apr. 19, 
2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/reference/1139793/overview-economic-damages 
[https://perma.cc/HD7L-NQ75]. (“The key driver of international commercial arbitrations is 
almost always the claimant’s desire to recover damages—to a greater degree even than in 
disputes in the domestic courts.”). 
69  Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 125 (Sept. 
13) (The case dealt with an expropriation of a German company in Poland. Germany argued 
that the expropriation violated the Treaty of Versailles and Articles 6–22 of the Convention 
Concerning Upper Silesia. The PCIJ found first that the expropriation had been illegal and 
then stated its doctrine on the consequences). 
70  Id. 
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international wrongful act or omission, as opposed to setting a price to the 
breach of the international obligation.71 Based on these precedents, the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations resolved in a 1986 arbitration case that 
[t]he authority to issue an order for the cessation or discontinuance of a wrongful 
act or omission results from the inherent powers of a competent tribunal which 
is confronted with the continuous breach of an international obligation which is 
in force and continues to be in force. The delivery of such an order requires, 
therefore, two essential conditions intimately linked, namely that the wrongful 
act has a continuing character and that the violated rule is still in force at the 
time in which the order is issued.72 
The view of these judicial authorities was consistent with the interpretation 
of early international investment proceedings. For example, in Texaco 
(TOPCO) v. Libyan Arab Republic the tribunal argued that “any possible award 
of damages should necessarily be subsidiary to the principal remedy of perfor-
mance itself. . . . [T]the Libyan Government, the defendant, is legally bound to 
perform these contracts and to give them full effect.”73 In that case, the tribunal 
found that the Libyan government, by nationalizing the oil industry, breached 
its contractual obligations under the deeds of concession, and as a consequence 
the tribunal ordered a restitutio in integrum.74 
                                                        
71  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 149, ¶ 292 (June 27); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teh-
ran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 44, ¶ 95 (May 24). 
72  Rainbow Warrior Affair (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 215, 270 (1990). 
73  Texaco Overseas Petrol. Co. v. Gov’t of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389, 508, 
511 (1977). 
74  It is important to note that another tribunal regarding the Libyan nationalization process 
took a different approach. The tribunal in LIAMCO v. Libya, after finding that there had 
been an expropriation of the assets of the oil company, stated “it is impossible to compel a 
State to make restitution, this would constitute in fact an intolerable interference in the inter-
nal sovereignty of States. . . . Further, restitution presupposes the cancellation of the nation-
alization measures at issue, and such cancellation violates also the sovereignty of the nation-
alizing State.” Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Gov’t of the Libyan Arab Republic, 20 I.L.M. 124–25 
(1981). Nevertheless, I argue that this case involved a traditional expropriation of foreign 
assent. Consequently, the compensation-expropriation spectrum was consistent with the 
remedies available for expropriations. For a distinction of this spectrum and its application to 
other types of investment rights, see the discussion further down in this section, see BP Expl. 
Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award, 53 I.L.R. 297, 353 (1973) 
(observing that when investors file a complaint at the international level restitutio in in-
tegrum can only be achieved when the wrongdoing State agrees to it. Whatever happens at 
the remedy stages of the proceeding is independent of the will of the home State of the for-
eign investor. This conclusion stands in contrast to state-to state international disputes, such 
as the ones that arise from the exercise of diplomatic protection); AGIP Spa. v. Gov’t of the 
Congo, 67 I.L.R. 319, 338–39, at ¶¶ 86–88 (ICSID 1979); Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 27 
I.L.M. 1314, 1358 (1988) (arguing that “[i]n no system of law are private interests permitted 
to prevail over duly established public interest, making impossible actions required for the 
public good. Rather private parties who contract with a government are only entitled to fair 
compensation when measures of public policy are implemented at the expense of their con-
tract rights. No justification exists for a different treatment of foreign private interests.”). 
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IV. THE ESSENCE OF THE PRIVATE REGIME: MONETARY COMPENSATION 
Notwithstanding the fact that the system, as designed originally, provided 
arbitrators the power to order injunctions and performance, most contemporary 
tribunals’ decisions have not ordered a State to modify its illegal behavior, to 
reform its decision-making process to respect contractual terms with foreign 
interests, or to change legislation that is affecting the business interests of for-
eign investors.75 The way the regime’s remedies operate in practice does not 
follow the logic of public law adjudication. Rather, it continues being one of 
private litigation. The act is to remain as it stands, affecting the injured party, 
and the losing party is only required to pay compensation for the breach. In on-
ly two of the 228 cases where States were found in breach of their international 
obligations have arbitral tribunals ordered remedies that were not monetary 
awards.76 Arbitrators have treated all the rights contained in the Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties (BITs) as breaches of private contracts, instead of searching 
for an adequate remedy for each right. This practice has become so common 
that commentators assume that the system was created so that investors could 
request monetary compensations from foreign governments.77 Nevertheless, as 
expressed in the previous subsection, the opposite is true. The traditional view 
on the wrongful acts of the State and the spirit of the investment arbitration re-
gime allows arbitrators to order performance remedies before monetary com-
pensations are considered. However, investment tribunals decide to stick to pe-
cuniary obligations. 
What motivates contemporary arbitrators to ignore their full remedial pow-
ers? Some commentators blame it on the litigants. They argue that claimants 
have “defined their demands in monetary terms” as opposed to requesting other 
types of remedies.78 Others, like M. Sornarajah, take the view that it would be a 
                                                                                                                                 
These last two cases are examples of the effects of the compensation-expropriation spec-
trum. 
75  See supra Part III. 
76  In 46 percent of the 497 cases administered by the International Center for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) the tribunals upheld the investor’s claims. THE ICSID 
CASELOAD—STATISTICS, supra note 16, at 7, 14. The exception is Goetz v. Burundi, where 
the claimants demanded the reinstatement of a tax and custom free zone certificate. 
77  See IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 7–8 (2009) (this is one of the few books on compensation, 
but only covers the existing principles for calculating damages. In its own words “the calcu-
lation of compensation and damages pursues the aim of transforming legal claims into con-
crete amounts of money. . . . The obligation to pay compensation or damages may be based 
on different legal claims. In international investment law, three causes of action can general-
ly be identified: expropriation, breaches of international law, and breaches of contracts.”); 
M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 435 (2004) (in his book 
that explains the regime instead of including a chapter on remedies, he dedicates a whole 
chapter on compensation for nationalization of foreign investments that reviews the methods 
and discussions around the payment for full compensation). 
78  Schreuer, supra note 67, at 332 (“The fact that in the cases so far published, ICSID tribu-
nals have nearly always framed the obligations imposed by their awards in pecuniary terms 
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futile act for the tribunals to order performance remedies because “[w]hat is 
sought in an award is not a legal opinion but an award capable of enforcement 
and there does not exist any machinery for the enforcement of an award against 
a state party for the specific performance of a contract.”79 Nevertheless, even 
pecuniary damages are hard to recover from entities that enjoy sovereign im-
munity.80 It is true that “ICSID awards are more enforceable than most interna-
tional obligations,” but they ultimately rest “on the legitimacy of the obligation 
and a state’s desire to comply.”81 
Professor Thomas W. Wälde provided an alternative answer to why arbi-
trators have relied so much on compensatory remedies.82 He argues that in-
vestment tribunals tend to avoid giving “detailed reasoning for remedies and 
damages” because they often leave that to experts presented by the parties.83 
According to his review of arbitral decisions, “After the tribunal has indulged 
at length in lengthy legal debates on issues the arbitrators and counsel are 
trained for and familiar with, the compensation award suddenly emerges as if a 
white rabbit pulled by a magician out of his black hat.”84 Compensation then 
relies exclusively on the jurisprudence and logic of expropriation cases.85 Con-
                                                                                                                                 
is not due to a belief that they lack the power to proceed otherwise. Rather, the cases in-
volved situations in which the investment relationship had broken down and the claimants 
have preferred to frame their demands in monetary terms.”). 
79  SORNARAJAH, supra note 77, at 281 (although he does recognize in previous paragraphs 
(p. 279) that “[a]n award in a dispute arising from a state contract with an alien is usually 
based on three types of remedies. The first is the possibility that the arbitrator may order 
specific performance of the contract. The second is that the award could be declaratory in 
nature. The third is the usual and most important of the remedies—payment of monetary 
compensation.”). 
80  CARBONNEAU & BUTLER, supra note 24, at 405–07 (explaining the evolution of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in the U.S. “under which States, their instrumentalities, and their 
property enjoy immunity from the exercise of jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments 
by courts of other States”). 
81  Alvarez, supra note 46, at 244 (“[I]t is always hard to secure payment from an entity that 
enjoys sovereign immunity. Although ICSID awards are more enforceable than most interna-
tional obligations, they are not immune from the fundamental weakness of all such obliga-
tions: namely, that enforcement rests in the end on the legitimacy of the obligation and a 
state’s desire to comply.”); Edward Baldwin et al., Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards, 
23 J. INT’L ARB. 1, 3 (2006); Goodman, supra note 20, at 465–66. Furthermore, as stated by 
the arbitral tribunal in the Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. Tajikistan case, “possible prob-
lems of enforcement do not in and of itself make specific performance an impermissible 
remedy.” Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. The Republic of Tajikistan, Case No. V 
(064/2008), Final Award, at ¶ 50 (Arb. Inst. Stockholm Chamber of Com. 2010), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0024_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6Y4A-34AP]. 
82  See Thomas W. Wälde, Remedies and Compensation in International Investment Law, 5 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 1 (2005). 
83  Id. at 5. 
84  Id. 
85 Id. at 8. (“The dominant view—both in arbitral jurisprudence and literature—on remedies 
and damages in investment arbitration is almost exclusively formed by the experiences with 
un- or under- compensated expropriation. The background of most experiences for arbitral 
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temporary arbitrators see their remedies’ power “through the prism of the ex-
propriation debate: [t]hat means first the ‘standards of expropriation’ (‘full, 
prompt, adequate’, ‘market or genuine value’) and, second, how to value prop-
erty that was taken.”86 This view ignores the fact that contemporary BITs con-
tain more rights than only the right to receive a prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation in case of expropriation. 
The vast majority of the contemporary investment cases do not deal with 
direct expropriations as in the past, but with actions that tend to “leave the for-
mal property rights intact, but undermine the normal commercial functioning of 
the bundle of property rights in a business.”87 The State in the majority of the 
cases acts both as regulator and as a party to a contract, and as such engages in 
actions that are not expropriations, but rather actions that affect the “fair and 
equitable” treatment of the investor.88 Instead of expropriating assets directly, 
States take measures that discriminate against foreign investors, that breach 
their legitimate expectations, or that deny them justice in local court.89 The 
“expropriation-compensation” prism of analysis is often not appropriate to dis-
suade these conducts.90 Just as Hensler and Khatam recognize in their article, 
the most controversial cases are related to regulatory challenges such as  
claims against the United States and Canada seeking relief from stricter envi-
ronmental regulation, against Germany for deciding to phase out nuclear power 
plants in the wake of the nuclear reactor disaster in Fukushima, against Canada 
for challenging a Canadian (trial) court’s interpretation of the scope of patent 
protection for a pharmaceutical product (upheld by that country’s federal Court 
of Appeals), and against Guatemala for setting electric utility customers’ fees 
lower than the corporation had anticipated at the time of its investment.91  
These are not cases related to traditional expropriations. 
                                                                                                                                 
jurisprudence before the advent of direct investor-state arbitration are individual or large-
scale expropriations: in the 1920s and again after 1945 (takeover of Communist regimes, 
decolonisation & subsequent economic, state-oriented nationalism, New International Eco-
nomic Order policies).”). 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. (“Moreover, the expropriation prism also dominates the view of other forms of gov-
ernmental conduct affecting investors in breach of the non-conventional new disciplines of 
investment treaties—such as abuse of the dual power of government as both regulator and 
contract party to escape from the binding force of contracts, but also discrimination (‘nation-
al treatment’) and the types of abuse of government powers grouped together in the disci-
pline of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (e.g. denial of justice, breach of legitimate expecta-
tions). An expropriation-compensation analysis is often not appropriate for these non-
conventional investment treaty disciplines. If applied to the fullest extent, it tends to lead to 
excessive awards, and the logic which seemingly requires expropriation-type awards then 
acts as a disincentive to apply the novel investment disciplines effectively and in an accepta-
ble way.”). 
91  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 4, at 416. 
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According to Thomas Wälde, there is “need to free tribunals from the dom-
inance of exclusive expropriation analysis and to develop an approach to reme-
dies and damages that is appropriate for each specific investment treaty disci-
pline.”92 For example, tribunals could order the cessation of injurious conduct. 
Arbitrators could order parties to provide satisfaction in different ways, such as 
apologies, public statements, or recognition of unlawfulness. Moreover, in par-
ticular cases, they could order the restitution, not only of tangible property, but 
intangible rights such as intellectual property or contractual rights and the can-
cellation of administrative and judicial orders. In cases of concessions and li-
censes to exploit natural resources, they could also order non-monetary com-
pensatory remedies. Examples of such remedies could be offering similar 
business opportunities, equivalent properties, licensed-based investments, or 
participation in joint ventures with State owned-companies.93 In fact, if arbitral 
tribunals were ordering this type of remedy, they would be acting more like na-
tional judges than as arbitrators resolving private disputes as Hensler and Kha-
tam suggest. Regarding this point, Hensler and Khatam only recognize that 
“when corporations prevailed, they asked courts to confirm the arbitrators’ 
award, just as would happen if a business won an award against another busi-
ness in a domestic arbitration case.”94 However, this does not change their con-
clusion that investment arbitration is operating more like a public law adjudica-
tory proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Hensler and Khatam’s article is an excellent addition to the academic dis-
cussions on arbitration, and particularly on investment arbitration. Their article 
challenges us to reevaluate the public-private distinction in the context of this 
widely employed ADR mechanism. However, Hensler and Khatam retain some 
optimism in their conclusion. They believe that we can still maintain the dis-
tinction and that we can keep some disputes in the realm of the private proce-
dure and leave others, such as the ones involving discrimination, to the realm of 
public courts.95 However, as I have described in the previous paragraphs in-
vestment arbitration continues to be a private oriented process because arbitra-
tors exercise more restraint than judges when it comes to ordering injunctive 
relief. Even with the powers to order other types of remedies, they are afraid of 
ordering States to take actions that will stop violating investor’s rights. 
Consequently, when it comes to identifying the public/private distinction I 
feel more inclined to believe that the collapse of the categories has reached a 
point of hopeless contradiction. In the words of Duncan Kennedy, a breakdown 
of a distinction appears “when troublemakers begin to argue that the distinction 
                                                        
92  Wälde, supra note 82, at 8. 
93  Id. at 22–24. 
94  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 4, at 416. 
95  Id. at 421. 
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is incoherent because, no matter how you try to apply it, you end up in a situa-
tion of hopeless contradiction.”96 There is no longer a benefit of keeping them 
apart. What has emerged in the case of investment arbitration is a new category 
where the State and the corporations benefit by pricing the breach of their obli-
gations. Even if both sides complain in public debates about the existence of 
unaccountable arbitrators, the investors get paid, and the governments keep 
their policies intact. Moreover, some studies even suggest that States can price 
the breach and still attract foreign investment.97 Hence, the system cannot even 
ensure that the reputation of the State, if it decides not to pay, will affect the 
flows of foreign capital.98 
A curious contradiction on the narrative emerges as we try to fix the dis-
tinction. At the domestic level, the victims of arbitral proceedings are custom-
ers, employees, collective action beneficiaries, and small companies who are 
abused by big corporations but cannot receive adequate justice.99 The victims 
are the ones pushing to include due process and more accountability into the 
system or to take away the dispute from private arbitrators and bring it back in-
to the court system.100 The “good guys” are the “have-nots” who are the prima-
ry victims of the arbitral procedure.101 The “bad guys” at the domestic level are 
the big corporations that can manipulate the arbitral proceedings to their bene-
fit. At the international arena, as argued in the cases, the victims are the big 
companies whose property is affected and confiscated, but who would rather 
keep the procedural system intact.102 In the international arbitral procedure, the 
                                                        
96  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1351. 
97  Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and 
Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2009/2010, at 539 (2010); Brewster, Pricing Compliance, su-
pra note 15, at 294–95; Yackee, supra note 49, at 400. 
98  See generally Aisbett, supra note 47; Brewster, Pricing Compliance, supra note 15, at 
259; Yackee, supra note 49, at 399. 
99  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 4, at 393–99. See generally IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING 
JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 7–11 (2013). 
100  See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the 
Deck of Justice, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/busi 
ness/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/ 
KJN3-FKYX]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization 
of the Justice System,’ N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/ 
business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/ 
5CJC-Z3ZR]; Sen Franken and Judge Gorsuch on Arbitration, C-SPAN (Mar. 22, 2017), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4662732/sen-franken-judge-gorsuch-arbitration [https://per 
ma.cc/GZB2-RJXF]. 
101  See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW SOC. REV. 95, 124 (1974). 
102  See, e.g., Mike Cherney, Cargill Wins $77M From Mexico over NAFTA Violation, 
LAW360 (Sept. 21, 2009, 7:33 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/123636/cargill-wins-
77m-from-mexico-over-nafta-violation [https://perma.cc/6ZZE-RVFC]; Robert Rapier, How 
Venezuela Ruined Its Oil Industry, FORBES (May 7, 2017, 8:45 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2017/05/07/how-venezuela-ruined-its-oil-industry/ 
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victims are the “haves” who would like to adjudicate things through the private 
proceedings.103 It is the State, the perpetrator of the violation, who wants to cre-
ate a system with more accountability, to make the system more transparent, to 
clarify the powers of the arbitrators. The violators of the obligations would ra-
ther have judges deciding the dispute than private international arbitrators de-
ciding behind closed doors. In the international system, the “bad guys” violat-
ing investor’s rights become the victims of the arbitral proceeding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
[https://perma.cc/3AL4-88LX]; Argentina Settles Five Investment Treaty Awards, ALLEN & 
OVERY (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Argentina-
settles-five-investment-treaty-awards.aspx [https://perma.cc/JU5W-8X2D]. 
103  See generally Galanter, supra note 101, 128–35. 
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